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Conflict between the first amendment and the Copyright Act is
inevitable. Courts, however, have managed to dodge the first
amendment question in copyright cases. In nearly every case the
dodging has been accomplished by differentiating uncopyrightable
ideas from protected expression and by using the doctrine of fair
use.1 The idea/expression dichotomy has always been a part of
copyright. 2 Until 1976 the doctrine of fair use, however, was purely
judicially created.3 But in 1976 this concept was also codified in the
new Copyright Act.4
Commentators who have examined the dilemma of copyright and
the first amendment agree that either: there is no clash between the
first amendment and copyright law;5 or, if there is a conflict, the
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1. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 723 F.2d 195 (2d
Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980); Rosemont Enter. Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366
F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966).
2. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982). See also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-18
(1954); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-03 (1879).
3. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5678.
4. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
5. See infra notes 43-64 and accompanying text. See also Denicola, Copyright and
Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 18 PUB. ENT.
ADVERT. & ALLIED FIELDS L.Q. 241, 250-52 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Denicola,
Copyright and Free Speech]; Goldwag, Copyright Infringement and the First Amend-
ment, 29 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 1, 8 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Goldwag,
Copyright Infringement]; Note, Copyright: Unfair Use in Fair Competition-A Search
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fair use doctrine satisfies any requirements of the first amendment. 6
Courts have generally agreed with the commentators. 7
There are, of course, notable exceptions among the courts and
commentators, but none have conceptualized the entire problem. 8
This Article will show that there is a situation creating a clash be-
tween the first amendment and copyright law which requires a solu-
tion. It involves the exigent circumstances of a daily newspaper or
news broadcast and it occurs when there is no time to arrange for a
license or purchase of a copyrighted work before its use is necessi-
tated by the public interest requirements of the first amendment.
The following scenario illustrates the problem:
The editor or broadcaster is under a deadline. He receives, by
whatever means, a picture equivalent to those in the My Lai mas-
sacre or the Zapruder film. 9 His news sense says this must ap-
pear in the paper or on television. Then he notices a copyright
notice on the back of the photograph or attached to the film can.
He attempts to contact the owner of the copyright, but, to no
avail. The clock continues to run as facts about the story behind
the picture or film become available, making the story more and
more important. The editor or broadcaster is in a quandary.
Run the picture and he is liable for infringement, refuse to run
the picture and he has failed in his duty to protect the public
interest.
Although courts have repeatedly made allowances for exigent cir-
cumstances in news gathering,10 no case has been decided on point
when a copyright is also involved. As the United States Supreme
Court has recognized, when the public interest under the first
amendment is at stake, it is important that the government not cre-
ate a "chilling effect" by subjecting it to the whims of a judge's
interpretation of a statute. 1 This is especially apparent if the judge
for a Logical Rationale for the Protection of Investigative News Reporting, 30 OKLA. L.
REv. 214, 233 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Copyright: Unfair Use].
6. See infra notes 65-84 and accompanying text. See also Rosenfield, The Consti-
tutional Dimension of "Fair Use" In Copyright Law, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 790, 791
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Rosenfield, Fair Use]; Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in
Copyright: The "Exclusive Rights" Tensions in the New Copyright Act, 24 BULL. COPY-
RIGHT SOC'Y OF THE U.S.A. 215, 251 (1977).
7. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984);
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter. 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972
(2d Cir. 1980); Triangle Publications v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 626 F.2d 1171 (5th
Cir. 1980); Keep Thomson Governor Comm. v. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F.
Supp. 957 (D.N.H. 1978).
8. See infra notes 18-42 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
10. See, eg., Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Rosen-
bloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
11. See, e.g., Baird v. State Bar of Az., 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965);
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
[Vol. 21
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is required to interpret doctrines as amorphous as the idea/expres-
sion dichotomy or fair use to protect the first amendment. As
stated, courts deciding copyright cases have generally shunned bas-
ing their decision on first amendment grounds, choosing rather a
"stretching" of copyright principles to find an exception to copy-
right protection. 12 Perhaps this is a symptom of the situation in
which the traditional defenders of first amendment rights-the
press-are as interested in protecting their own copyrights as those
they might accuse of violating the first amendment via the copy-
right law. 13 The danger of stretching copyright principles is that
these cases can be used as precedent for decisions not involving a
valid public interest.' 4 This could lead to an unnecessary usurpa-
tion of copyright protections.
To accomplish the goals of this Article, first, a probe of the scope
of the problem and the reasons dictating an exception to the copy-
right law under the public interest requirements of the first amend-
ment is in order. Next, an examination of the idea/expression
dichotomy and the fair use doctrine will be undertaken. Then, to
show the need for a separate exception to copyright protections this
Article will examine cases that have taken the copyright scheme to
its limits in an attempt to protect the public interest, including the
12. Ironically, the only copyright cases where the first amendment has been recog-
nized is in the "commercial speech" area. See Consumers Union of United States v.
General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1983); Triangle Publications v. Knight-
Ridder Newspapers, 445 F. Supp. 875 (S.D. Fla. 1978). In a dissent from a refusal by
the Second Circuit to rehear the Consumers Union case, Judge Oakes said the three-
judge panel's decision "missapplies the doctrine of commercial free speech and takes the
heart out of the 'fair use' doctrine. . . ." 730 F.2d 47, 48 (1984) (Oakes, J., dissent-
ing). He went on to say that "the use of 'commercial free speech' to justify a fair use
defense to copyright infringement stands either the copyright law or the First Amend-
ment on its head.. . . Doing so in the name of the First Amendment, I fear, cheapens
that Amendment's coin." Id at 50. Although this crack in the court's usual refusal to
recognize any first amendment exception to copyright laws may be used eventually by
media defendants to argue for a complete first amendment exception to copyright laws,
the commercial speech question is outside the scope of this Article and will not be
addressed.
13. A survey of the Congressional reports concerning the copyright revision
showed there was no argument made in favor of a first amendment exception to the
copyright law for the media. Robert Evans, vice president and general counsel of
C.B.S., Inc. spoke against provisions in the then proposed act that would have allowed
infringement by educational institutions of C.B.S. news programs. Omnibus Copyright
Revision: Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcommittee on Courts Civil Liberies, and
the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
683-90 (1975) (statement of Robert V. Evans, Vice President and General Counsel,
C.B.S., Inc.).
14. This was part of the argument used by Harper & Row in their petition for a
writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. They said "the limitations on
what is protectable will not be limited to cases in which copyrighted material has been
used by the news media." Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 17, Harper & Row, Pub-
lishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., cert granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
Petition, Nation] [copy on file in the offices of California Western Law Review].
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most recent and far reaching case of Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enterprises.15 The United States Supreme Court recently
granted a review of the Nation decision.1 6 This could lead to a solu-
tion to this problem, but a decision is not expected until early
1985.17 Finally, this Article will propose a solution.
I. THE PROBLEM
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the
inherent problems of a reporter working under a deadline.1 8 In one
case, even though the Court eventually found against the media de-
fendant, Justice Blackmun stated that, 19 "[A] reporter trying to
meet a deadline may find it totally impossible to check thoroughly
the accuracy of his sources."' 20 It is logical, therefore, to find that
the same exigent circumstances exception should also apply to the
use of copyrighted materials when a newspaper or broadcaster is
under deadline pressures.
A chilling effect on the media will occur if an exception is not
granted for the limited use of copyrighted materials under deadline
pressures, when the use of such materials is necessitated by the pub-
lic interest. The United States Supreme Court has recognized fac-
tual circumstances and remedied laws that have had a chilling effect
on the public interest under the first amendment.21 This is another
example of a situation requiring such a remedy.
In order to narrow the problem, the situations must be defined in
which the public interest under the first amendment would require
use of copyrighted materials so that the proposed exception does
not undermine the protections afforded authors under the copyright
law.
Some commentators and courts have at least recognized the con-
tradiction between copyright law and the public interest under the
first amendment. 22 Professor Melville Nimmer believes there is a
15. 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984).
16. Id.
17. Telephone interview with Edward A. Miller, attorney for the petitioners, (June
4, 1984).
18. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Rosenbloom
v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
19. In the Wolston case, although Justice Rehnquist found against the media de-
fendant in a libel action, the Court's decision was based in part on the fact that the
author of the libelous article was a historian who had more time to check his facts than
a reporter working on a daily deadline. 443 U.S. at 171 (1979) (Blackman, J.,
concurring).
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Baird v. State Bar of Az., 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965);
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
22. See, e.g., 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.10 (1978) [hereinafter
[Vol. 21
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general failure to perceive the problem.2 3 He states "It cannot be
denied that the copyright laws do in some degree abridge freedom
of speech, and if the First Amendment were literally construed,
copyright would be unconstitutional. '24 But Professor Nimmer
goes on to say, "No one can responsibly adhere to the position that
the First Amendment must be literally construed so as to invalidate
all laws which in any degree abridge speech."'2 5
The contradiction begins with the Constitution. The Constitu-
tion expressly gives Congress the power to maintain a copyright law
to "promote the progress of science and useful arts."'2 6 Copyright
law originated in England as a basis for controlling censorship. 27
But by the time of the adoption of the the Statute of Anne, consid-
ered the first copyright statute, copyright was no longer used for
censorship. 28 A new basis for copyright was assumed, and recently
the United States Supreme Court reiterated the rationale:
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are
neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special pri-
vate benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an
important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to mo-
tivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provi-
sion of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the
products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive con-
trol has expired. 29
Given the constitutional copyright authority, there are many ap-
proaches to the meaning of the Framer's first amendment to the
Constitution which states in pertinent part: "Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press
. ... ,,30 Some have stated that the amendment is an "absolute,"
that is, when the Framers said "no law" they meant no law,31 while
others advocate a "balancing" to determine what is protected under
the first amendment and what is not.3 2 One of the foremost think-
cited as 1 NIMMER]; Rosenfield, Fair Use, supra note 6; Goldstein, Copyright and the
First Amendment 70 COLUM. L. RxV. 983 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Goldstein,
Copyright].
23. 1 NIMMER, supra note 22, at 1-62.
24. Id. at 1-64.
25. Id. at 1-65.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8.
27. See Goldstein, Copyright, supra note 22, at 983-84.
28. Id.
29. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774, 782 (1984).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
31. Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes" A Public Interview, 37
N.Y.U. L. REv. 549, 553 (1962).
32. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49-56 (1961). In this decision Justice
Harlan detailed his balancing approach. For an analysis of this approach, see
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, Sup. Cr. REV. 245, 251-52 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Meiklejohn, The First Amendment].
1985]
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ers on the first amendment, Alexander Meiklejohn, siding with a
modified absolutist approach, elucidates the needed solution the
best:
We are looking for a principle which is not in conflict with any
other provision of the Constitution, a principle which, as it now
stands, is "absolute" in the sense of being "not open to excep-
tions," but a principle which also is subject to interpretation, to
change, or to abolition, as the necessities of a precarious world
may require.33
Meiklejohn has interpreted the first amendment as not an indi-
vidual's right to speak, but, rather, a community's right to hear.34
Free speech and free press under the first amendment have a vital
social importance. "If citizens are to exercise their obligations in
democratic society, it is essential that the channels of communica-
tion be opened."35 This notion has been generally termed the "mar-
ketplace of ideas." That is, all ideas should be tested in open dialog
and debate. 36 Thus, there is a public interest at stake under the first
amendment whenever there is a restriction on the free flow of infor-
mation. Copyright can serve to restrict the free flow of information,
thereby depriving the public of the tools necessary to function prop-
erly in the democratic society.
Some restrictions on freedom of speech have been repeatedly up-
held. Justice Holmes has stated that the first amendment does not
protect someone who shouts "fire" in a theater causing a panic, 37
and Justice Harlan has enumerated a list containing, libel, slander,
misrepresentation, obscenity, perjury, false advertising, solicitation
of a crime, complicity by encouragement, and conspiracy, as not
being protected by the amendment. 38 Is copyright, by virtue of its
constitutional basis, excluded from the ambit of the first
amendment?
Professor Nimmer states that because the first amendment is an
amendment, it supersedes anything inconsistent in the main body of
the Constitution. 39 When the public interest under the first amend-
ment is involved the copyright law must give way.40
Thus, the conflict on a superficial basis is apparent. Copyright
33. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment, supra note 32, at 253.
34. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 26-28 (1965).
35. J. BARRON & C. DIENES, HANDBOOK OF FREE SPEECH AND FREE PRESS 5
(1979).
36. Id. at 4.
37. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
38. Konigsberg, 366 U.S. 36, 49 n.10.
39. 1 NIMMER, supra note 22, at 1-63, 1-64.
40. See Triangle Publications v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 626 F.2d 1171, 1178-
84 (5th Cir. 1980) (Brown, J., concurring and dissenting); Bruzzone v. Miller Brewing
Co., 202 U.S.P.Q. 809, 812 (BNA) (N.D. Cal. 1979). See also Denicola, Copyright and
Free Speech, supra note 5, at 266. Denicola said, "When the objectives of free speech
[Vol. 21
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law could restrict the free flow of information which, in the public
interest, is required under the first amendment. It is argued, how-
ever, by many, that the conflict is easily reconciled, either, by the
copyright maxim that only expression is copyrightable not ideas,41
and the dissemination of ideas is what satisfies the public interest,
or, by fair use.42
II. THE IDEA/EXPRESSION DICHOTOMY
The first aspect of the copyright scheme to be examined, and
urged by courts and commentators as protection for the first
amendment, is the idea/expression dichotomy found in the copy-
right code. It is argued, that as long as the distinction can be made
between expression and ideas, the public interest under the first
amendment will be satisfied because the public will still have access
to the ideas.43 As one commentator has aptly expressed the theory
"a line can be established between the first amendment rights and
copyright by separating the substance (fact or ideas) from the ex-
pression (pattern, development, language, style, etc.) of the 'writing'
and protecting the latter while permitting free use of the former." 44
But Professor Nimmer illustrates a problem where the expression
and idea are so "wedded" it is impossible to separate them in order
to determine what is protected.45 This situation arises primarily in
the area of copyrighted photographs. For example, the pictures of
the My Lai massacre. The actual photograph is the expression and
therefore protected under copyright laws. But Professor Nimmer
suggests it would be impossible to satisfactorily describe the idea of
the photographs in any way that would satisfy the public's right to
know without the pictures themselves. 46 Therefore, says Professor
Nimmer, "it would seem that the speech interest outweighs the
copyright interest." 47 The likelihood of this predicament arising
under exigent circumstances is acute. An editor or producer could
find himself faced with a decision, under deadline pressures, as to
whether he should use such a photograph, even knowing that the
photograph was copyrighted in the public interest.
The Nimmer scenerio has been addressed by one court in Time,
require access to the expression of another, the property interest created by copyright
law must yield, regardless of the economic impact." Id.
41. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982). See also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 217-18 (1954);
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-03 (1879).
42. See infra notes 65-84 and accompanying text.
43. See supra note 5.
44. Note, Copyright, Unfair Use, supra note 5, at 233.
45. 1 NIMMER, supra note 22, at 1-81.
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Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates.48 The dispute in that case con-
cerned the copying of several frames from the famous Zapruder
film, an amateur filming of the assassination of President Kennedy,
in a book questioning the Warren Commission report on the shoot-
ing.49 Soon after the assassination, Time, Inc. paid Abraham Za-
pruder $150,000 for the film and proceeded to publish frames of the
film in Life magazine.
When the Warren Commission was appointed to investigate the
assassination, Life consented to the use of the film by the govern-
ment for their investigation.50 The film was considered very valua-
ble for this purpose.5 1 Researchers had access to the film at the
National Archives where all the documents used by the Warren
Commission were deposited. The author of the infringing book was
a consultant to Life at one time. There was a dispute as to where he
obtained the slides to make the copies used in the book.52 The au-
thor and his publisher had made several attempts to obtain permis-
sion to use the photographs from Time, Inc., but had been
refused.5 3
The court called the fair use question "the most difficult issue in
the case."' 54 Although it did not mention the first amendment, the
court found the use of the film copies fair use, saying: "In deter-
mining the issue of fair use, the balance seems to be in favor of
defendants. There is a public interest in having the fullest informa-
tion available on the murder of President Kennedy."' 55
The decision in Geis has been criticized because of the allegedly
faulty reasoning of the court in finding there was no economic in-
jury to the plaintiff by the copying of the film frames.5 6 The court
said, "The Book is not bought because it contained the Zapruder
pictures; the Book is bought because of the theory of Thompson
[the book's author] and its explanation, supported by Zapruder's
pictures."' 57 Professor Nimmer argues that the decision can only be
supported, "not on the ground of fair use, but rather because of the
previously described free speech elements inherent in the film." '58
48. 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
49. Id. at 133.
50. Id. at 134.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 135.
53. Id. at 137.
54. Id. at 144.
55. Id. at 146 (emphasis added).
56. 1 NIMMER, supra note 22, at 1-86, 1-88. See also Denicola, Copyright and Free
Speech, supra note 5, at 265; Goldwag, Copyright Infringement, supra note 5, at 17.
57. Geis, 293 F. Supp. at 146.
58. 1 NIMMER, supra note 22, at 1-87. See also Goldwag, Copyright Infringement,
supra note 5, at 17.
[Vol. 21
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Professor Nimmer criticizes the reasoning that the Zapruder film
could still be used by the plaintiff, Time, Inc., for future motion
pictures. He uses a time honored example of how infringement can
take place from one medium to another (i.e., from a book to a
movie) as an analogy to show that the economic harm to Time, Inc.
was not just "speculative," as the Geis court said, but rather a harm
without question.59
The rationale of the court, however, seems the better reasoning,
especially in light of recent cases that have expanded the doctrine of
fair use.60 Professor Nimmer made his argument in a section of his
treatise in which he argues for a limited first amendment exception
to copyrighted photographs with a compulsory license approach.61
He seems to have strained the argument in this situation by failing
to address the fact that only 22 "partials" of frames62 were used in
the book.63 It is hard to believe that the book would affect the sales
of a movie made by Time, Inc. showing the entire film or even an-
other book about the assassination, as Professor Nimmer asserts. It
is more reasonable to accept Judge Wyatt's assumption that the
book would enhance sales of any film by the plaintiff.64 Besides the
dilemma illustrated by Professor Nimmer, there are other problems
in the idea/expression area. The problem, illustrated along with
others, add to the lack of predictability in the area, exacerbating the
problem for newspapers and broadcasters deciding to use copy-
righted materials under deadline pressures.
III. THE FAIR USE DOCTINE
According to the latest pronouncement from the United States
Supreme Court, once a copyright has been infringed a defendant
may still invoke the defense of fair use, making the infringement
excusable.65 This doctrine has been called the "right of reasonable
access to copyrighted materials."' 66 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit has termed the doctrine the "most troublesome in
the whole law of copyright." 67 Commentators disagree as to
whether the doctrine is constitutionally mandated or merely a sub-
59. 1 NIMMER, supra note 22, at 1-87.
60. See infra notes 128-49 and accompanying text.
61. 1 NIMMER, supra note 22, at 1-84, 1-85.
62. The book utilized charcoal sketches that were derivative works and therefore
an infringement, but complete frames were not reproduced.
63. Geis, 293 F. Supp. at 139.
64. Id. at 146.
65. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774, 784 (1984).
The Court said: "anyone. . . who makes a fair use of the work is not an infringer of
the copyright with respect to such use." Id.
66. Rosenfield, Fair Use, supra note 6, at 791.
67. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (1939).
1985]
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stantive rule of copyright, 68 but many courts and commentators
state boldly that the concept rectifies any clash between the first
amendment and copyright law.69
Although the doctrine was recently included in the copyright law
revision 70 it began in the courts. In Folsom v. Marsh,71 the first case
fully adopting the doctrine, Justice Story stated that "This is one of
those intricate and embarrassing questions . . . in which it is not
. . . easy to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion."' 72 The infringe-
ment in Folsom, or piracy as they called it then, was of a book enti-
tled The Writings of George Washington.73 Former Chief Justice
Marshall was a part owner of the copyright on the book.74 It con-
sisted of correspondence, addresses, messages, and other papers of
President Washington. The defendants' book contained 388 pages
taken verbatim from plaintiffs. Justice Story enunciated a test for
what he called the "fair and bona fide abridgement of an original
work," that was not piracy.7 5 "We must . . . look to the nature
and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the
materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the
sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original
work." 76 Much of this test has been incorporated in the present
codification of the fair use doctrine.77
Although Justice Story expressed sympathy for the defendants,
68. See Rosenfield, Fair Use, supra note 6, at 791. Rosenfield said:
Fair use-the right of reasonable access to copyrighted materials--has consti-
tutional protection both directly and under the penumbra of the first and
ninth amendments. This constitutional dimension protects the right of rea-
sonable access to our cultural, educational, scientific, historical, technical, and
intellectual heritage.
Id. But see Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech, supra note 5, at 261. Denicola said:
The ability of fair use doctrine to reconcile copyright law with free speech has
led some to conclude that the doctrine is in essence a constitutional one, with
its contours determined by the first amendment. This conclusion is unneces-
sary and perhaps unwise. The fair use doctrine simply immunizes from liabil-
ity certain invasions of statutorily created property rights. That it may
operate in some instances to avoid potential conflicts between those property
rights and the interests protected by the first amendment need not elevate the
doctrine to constitutional status.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
69. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 723 F.2d 195, 206
(2d Cir. 1983). See also Goldwag, Copyright Infringement, supra note 5, at 13.
70. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
71. Although some portions of the fair use doctrine appeared before the Folsom
case, Folsom is generally considered the first case to fully detail the doctrine. Time, Inc.
v. Bernard Geis Assoc. 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
72. 9 F. Cas. at 344.
73. Id. at 345.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 348.
77. See Lawrence, Copyright Law, Fair Use, and the Academy: An Introduction, in
FAIR USE AND FREE INQUIRY 3, 10 (J.S. Lawrence & B. Timberg, eds. 1980).
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he found that their copying was so great that it could not be pro-
tected by fair use. He affirmed the recommendation of the master
and granted an injunction against the distribution of the defendants'
book.78 The courts have continuously upheld this doctrine, includ-
ing modifications, to cope with technological changes. 79 But as Jus-
tice Story said in Folsom: "what constitutes a fair and bona fide
abridgment, in the sense of the law, is one of the most difficult
points . . which can well arise for judicial discussion." 80
The current statutory scheme used for fair use heeds Justice
Story's warning and does not attempt to define the doctrine.
Rather, the code sets out some of the types of infringements in
which fair use could be invoked81 and the factors that "shall" be
considered when determining whether it is available.82 The codifi-
cation was not meant to change the judicial doctrine of fair use but
merely to restate what is already the law.83
One of the criteria enunciated in the statute is the effect of the
infringing use on the potential market value of the copyrighted
work. This factor is considered the most important to the determi-
nation of fair use.84 It also has the greatest potential for eliminating
fair use as a protection of the first amendment. It is very likely that
the use of copyrighted materials in exigent circumstances will im-
pair the commerciality of the copyrighted work. Nevertheless, as
will be shown, this limited infringement is necessary to preserve the
fundamentals of the first amendment. Some courts have sought to
alleviate this potential first amendment problem by stretching the
copyright scheme to its farthest reaches.
78. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. 342, 349 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
79. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984).
80. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 345.
81. These uses include, "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classrooms), scholarship, or research .... " 17 U.S.C. § 107
(1982).
82. The factors include,
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of
the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
Id.
83. As stated in the House Report, "Section 107 is intended to restate the present
judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." H.R.
REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5659, 5680.
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IV. THE FAR REACHES OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTON
UNDER THE COPYRIGHT SCHEME
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises85 illustrates
the utilization of both the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair
use doctrine carried to the limits of the copyright scheme in an ef-
fort to protect the public interest under the first amendment. The
decision, by the authoritative Second Circuit, concerned the unau-
thorized publication of a former President's memoirs by a weekly
magazine. The arbitrary nature of copyright decisions when the
public interest is involved is shown by the district court's finding of
infringement, its award of damages, and the subsequent reversal by
the appellate court. It is therefore instructive to trace the history of
the case.
Former President Ford, with the assistance of a professional
writer, Trevor Armbrister, completed the first draft of his book in
February, 1979. Two months later, Ford's publishers licensed ex-
clusive rights to Time magazine to print pre-publication excerpts.
But in March, 1979, an unidentified person brought a copy of the
draft to Victor Navasky, editor of The Nation.86 This magazine is
one of America's oldest continuously published weekly
magazines, 87 devoted primarily to news and politics.8 8 According
to the district court, "believing that the draft contained 'a real hot
news story' concerning Ford's pardon of former President Nixon, as
well as lesser news," Navasky spent overnight or perhaps the next
twenty-four hour period quoting and paraphrasing from a number
of sections of the memoirs. Navasky added no comment of his own.
"He did not check the material," said the district court.89 The arti-
cle was published on April 3, 1979.
As a result of this publication, Time magazine refused to publish
its pre-publication excerpts and did not pay the second $12,500 due
upon such publication. 90 The portions of the memoirs dealing with
the pardon of Nixon were quoted and paraphrased extensively by
Navasky in The Nation and were the material that Time magazine
had wanted to print.9 '
In the district court, Judge Owen rejected the defendant's first
85. 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984).
86. Id. at 198.
87. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1069
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
88. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 723 F.2d 195, 198 (2d Cir.
1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984).
89. Nation, 557 F. Supp. at 1069 (emphasis added) (ironically, after finding the
article infringed on plaintiffs copyright and caused economic loss, the court published
the article in the appendix of the opinion).
90. Nation, 723 F.2d at 199.
91. Nation, 557 F. Supp. at 1072 n.10.
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amendment argument by saying: "While there may be a circum-
stance in which the First Amendment provides a defendant with
greater protection than the fair use doctrine, this is not, in my judg-
ment, one of them."' 92 Judge Owen did not examine whether the
material used was copyrightable, and rejected defendant's plea that
any copyright infringement was protected by fair use because it was
"news." ' 93 In an unprecedented theory, Judge Owens said The Na-
tion article was not news because it did not contain "hot news,"
despite the expert opinions of three journalists that it was news. In
addition, the court indulged in some hindsight analysis to determine
whether the article was news sufficient to be fair use.94
The appeals court repudiated Judge Owen's news analysis. Writ-
ing for the majority, Judge Kaufman said:
The court [referring to the district court], in short, substituted its
own views concerning the quality of the journalism in The Na-
tion article, and then determined that it was not news because it
was not good or genuine news. There is no indication in either
the statutory language or the case law that determination of fair
use should turn on the question of how well a given purpose was
performed. Indeed, this Court has eschewed judicial evaluation
of quality in fair use analysis. 95
A. Idea/Expression Dichotomy Under Nation
The main thrust of the opinion of the apellate court, however,
was not a rejection of the news standard. The court decided the
bulk of the copied materials were not copyrightable under the idea/
expression dichotomy. Judge Kaufman set the tone for what was to
follow with this soliloquy:
Almost ten years ago, this nation endured a grave threat to its
domestic political life. The report of a burglary at Democratic
National Headquarters in the Watergate complex of Washing-
ton, D.C. led to a historic constitutional confrontation. The
President, suspected of involvement in covering up the crime and
its partisan origins, pitted his will against the resolve of a Con-
gress endeavoring to discover the true facts. The citizens of this
country watched with awe as revelation after revelation led fi-
nally to the first resignation of a President of the United States.
This singular event was followed by another equally unprece-
dented act. Richard M. Nixon, not yet indicted for the commis-
sion of any crimes, was pardoned for any offenses by his
successor in office, President Gerald Ford. Reverberations from
those shocks to the nation's constitution are still being felt, and
92. Id. at 1070 n.4.
93. Id. at 1070.
94. Id. at 1071.
95. Nation, 723 F.2d at 207 (citations omitted).
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this case is another of those repercussions. 96
Judge Kaufman proceeded to destroy the plaintiff's case for copy-
right infringement. He was able to find that all of the copied mate-
rial lacked copyrightablility, except 300 words, which he easily
knocked out with fair use.97
In the carefully drafted opinion, Judge Kaufman, dissected the
magazine article from The Nation. First, he pointed out that ideas
or facts are not protected by copyright. 98 He delineated in the opin-
ion that "neither news events, nor facts of a biographical nature is
deserving of the protection of the Act." 99 Then Judge Kaufman
detailed the crux of his argument, saying that although the distinc-
tion between idea and expression "is not always easy to draw. . . in
this case, there can be no concern that this mode of expression was
usurped; The Nation article drew only upon scattered parts and not
the total entity with its unique and protected mosaic."' o
Judge Kaufman admitted that "some" of the direct quotations
used by The Nation article were copyrightable,101 but he character-
ized the paraphrasing, generally considered a form of copying,10 2 as
merely "paraphrasings of disparate facts."'' 0 3 But instead of stick-
ing to the facts distinction, Judge Kaufman also said this is not in-
fringement because The Nation article didn't copy a "whole," that
is, the whole book or a whole chapter. 04 Judge Kaufman offers no
authority for his distinction.10 5 The distinction is necessary, says
Judge Kaufman, to prevent "a clash with the First Amendment."'' 0 6
Although Judge Kaufman, on several occasions, made reference
to the requirements of the first amendment, he was careful not to
base the holding on a first amendment exception to copyright. 0 7
The first amendment, however, is continuously lurking in the back-
96. Id. at 197.
97. Id. at 206-09.
98. Id. at 202. See also supra notes 43-64 and accompanying text.
99. Nation, 723 F.2d at 202 (citations omitted). See also supra notes 48-64 and
accompanying text; and see infra notes 13149 and accompanying text.
100. Nation, 723 F.2d at 203.
101. Id. But when the quotes were from other people, Judge Kaufman excluded
them from his list of copyrightable words.
102. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
103. Nation, 723 F.2d at 203 (emphasis added).
104. Id. This theory by Judge Kaufman was first enunciated in the case of Hoehling
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980).
105. See Nation, 723 F.2d at 212-17 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 204.
107. Telephone interview with Andrew L. Deutsch, attorney for defendant (Apr. 23,
1984). In discussing whether the Supreme Court would grant certiorari to the plaintiffs,
Deutsch said he would be "surprised" if it happened. Attorneys for Harper & Row,
however, seem to disagree. They said, "In its analysis both of copyrightability and of
fair use, the majority found the First Amendment considerations prevailed over copy-
right considerations." Petition, Nation, supra note 14, at 9-10.
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ground, forming an integral part of the opinion. As Judge Kauf-
man said, "Nowhere could the need to construe the concept of
copyrightability in accord with First Amendment freedoms be more
important than in the instant case."108
Essentially, Judge Kaufman has established a doctrine that the
concept of protectable "expression" will be construed most nar-
rowly when there are first amendment considerations involved. 10 9
The court also expounded two other concepts that would serve to
protect the public interest under the first amendment.
First, the court discussed the district court's fimding that Presi-
dent Ford's expression of his "state of mind" was copyrightable.
Judge Kaufman called the theory "novel" and says "it seems to
defy common sense."' 10 Judge Kaufman believed the state of mind
recollection of Ford represented "facts" not expression. He stated,
That conception of the law is tantamount to permitting a public
official to take private possession of the most important details of
a nation's historical and political life by adding language here
and there on the perceptions or sentiments he experienced while
in office and insisting the work's entire contents are thereby
made his alone by virtue of copyright. The Copyright Act was
not intended to provide such a private monopoly of fact at the
expense of the public's need to be informed.111
The court relied heavily for this analysis on Hoehling v. Universal
City Studios, Inc.1 2 Also, a Second Circuit case, written by Judge
Kaufman, then Chief Justice of the Second Circuit, Hoehling, was a
much easier case in which to comprehend the idea/expression
dichotomy.
The case concerned a book on the Hindenburg dirigible disaster
and the theory that sabatoge was involved. The alleged infringers
were the author of a book based on the theory but written in a more
"literary" style, and the makers of a subsequent movie based on the
book.113
Judge Kaufman began that opinion by stating, "protection af-
forded the copyright holder has never extended to history, be it doc-
umented fact or explanatory hypothesis."'1 14 He explained that the
rationale for the doctrine is that "knowledge is best served when
108. Nation, 723 F.2d at 204.
109. Harper & Row has argued that this is a completly new concept. Petition, Na-
tion, supra note 14, at 9-10.
110. Nation, 723 F.2d at 205.
111. Id. (citations omitted).
112. 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980).
113. Id. at 976.
114. Id. at 974.
1985]
15
Crowley: A First Amendment Exception to Copyright for Exigent Circumstance
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1984
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
history is the common property of all. . .."115
In addition, the court expressly rejected the theory of cases in
other circuits that the labor and resultant revelations from research
are copyrightable. 116 The court in Nation reiterated this principle in
the news area. The majority said that the essence of news is the
reporting of facts and information without adding commentary or
original research. They went on to say a court should not judge
what is news, but rather whether a claim of news reporting was
false. 117
The state of mind analysis, however, was dictum because the Na-
tion article copied the portion of the Ford manuscript "verbatim."
According to Judge Kaufman, because it was verbatim, "the literal
words are unquestionably copyrightable." 118 Presumably then,
under Judge Kaufman's scheme, had The Nation paraphrased the
sections on Ford's state of mind there would be no infringement
because the facts were not copyrightable. 119 Judge Kaufman did not
address the question of the result, if the paraphrasing amounted to
"wholesale appropriation," which he has established as the test for
infringement in these type of cases. 120 Would the public interest in
knowing the "state of mind" of a public official in "crucial political
decisions," win out over the author's copyright interest if there was
wholesale appropriation? These type of questions would have a
"chilling effect" on the media when deciding whether to use a news-
worthy copyrighted piece of property.
Second, Judge Kaufman excluded portions of the memoirs used
in the article from copyrightability, because he believed they were in
the public domain. He stated that when President Ford testified
before a congressional panel concerning the Nixon pardon, it put
the information in the public domain.1 21 This was, according to the
court, because the testimony was included in a government report
and government documents are not copyrightable.1 22 No mention
115. Id. Harper & Row has argued that this is a complete new set of definitions for
what is protectable under the copyright laws. Petition, Nation, supra note 14, at 10.
116. Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 974. See also 1 NIMMER, supra note 22, at 2-165-68.
117. Nation, 723 F.2d at 207.
118. Id. at 204.
119. Id. at 205 n.14. In his dissent, Judge Meskill argued that the articulation of
President Ford's state of mind was copyrightable. The majority agreed that the expres-
sion was protected. What the majority and the dissent disagreed on was whether the
material, utilized by The Nation, was facts of the state of mind or merely paraphrasing
which would constitute an infringement. The majority held a much narrower view of
what was paraphrasing than did the dissent. Id. at 205 n.14, 212-13.
120. See Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1980).
121. Harper & Row contend, "Ford's story was not based on government docu-
ments or information which Ford had sequestered from public view." Petition, Nation,
supra note 14, at 9.
122. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1982).
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was made of whether the government report was used verbatim in
the Ford book. If it was not taken verbatim from the report, then
even under Judge Kaufman's formula this would be a "compila-
tion" that he admits would be copyrightable. 123 That is, a compila-
tion of public domain material in a selective way can constitute a
protectable work. 124
This manifests another peculiar problem, concerning the issue of
what part of a "compilation" is protectable? Judge Kaufman is on
one end of the continuum, believing only a "wholesale usurpation"
of a compilation of nonprotectable facts, would constitute an in-
fringement. This is especially true when historical or public interest
facts are involved, according to Judge Kaufman. But other
courts12 5 and Professor Nimmer would find an infringement more
readily; especially when the selection and arrangement of the facts
are copied. 126 This creates additional uncertainty compounding the
"chilling effect" on any media person under a deadline.
Thus, through the use of various theories and doctrines under the
rubric of the idea/expression doctrine making them noncopyright-
able, the court was able to reduce the 2,250 mostly copied words of
the article to 300 that were protectable.1 27 Judge Kaufman also had
an answer as to why these 300 words were not actionable. The an-
swer was fair use.
B. Fair Use Under Nation
As stated earlier, the appellate court rejected the district court's
finding that "hot news" was necessary for fair use.128 The court
then went on to make its own finding that the Nation article was
"either news or of recent history." 129
Judge Kaufman's opinion then repudiated the district court's
analysis step by step through the four part test for fair use under the
copyright statute. 130 The court distinguished the case of Wain-
wright Securities, Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp.,131 which
123. Nation, 723 F.2d at 202 n.8.
124. A "compilation" is a work formed by the collection and assembling of
preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in
such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of
authorship. The term "compilation" includes collective works.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
125. See Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1977); Quinto v.
Legal Times of Wash., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 554 (D.C. 1981).
126. 1 NIMMER, supra note 22, at 2-164-65. See also Nation, 723 F.2d at 212-17
(Meskill, J., dissenting).
127. Nation, 723 F.2d at 206.
128. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
129. Nation, 723 F.2d at 207.
130. See supra note 82.
131. 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977).
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found against the media defendant, and relied instead on Rosemont
Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc.1 32
It is instructive to look at these two cases, along with a similar
Second Circuit case, to illustrate the lack of protection a newspaper
or broadcaster would have if either used copyrighted material in the
public interest. It is instructive for two reasons. First, the Second
Circuit is the leading circuit on these types of questions. Second,
and most importantly, these three cases, along with Nation and
Hoehling, demonstrate the lack of predictability in the area and the
disparate factors that may influence a case one way or another. Be-
cause the copyright section on fair use is mandatory in its command
to consider the four factors detailed in the statute, 133 it provides a
good framework for consideration of these cases.
The first factor is whether the purpose and character of the use is
commercial or nonprofit.13 4 This is an important factor to a news-
paper or broadcaster under a deadline because most of these media
are operated as commercial enterprises. Therefore, these potential
defendants could be precluded from a fair use defense due to their
commercial nature and despite their purpose of serving the public
interest. This problem has been made especially critical with the
most recent United States Supreme Court decision on fair use,135 in
which the Court said the use of copying for a commercial or profit-
making purpose is "presumptively" unfair.13 6 This tips the balanc-
ing away from the granting of fair use in this type of case.
The Nation court, however, pointed out that the Second Circuit
has held copying for commercial purposes is not conclusively ex-
cluded from a fair use defense.137 The court relied on Rosemont
Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc.138 In that case, the accused
infringer used portions of a Look magazine article when writing a
biography on aviation and movie mogul Howard Hughes. The case
was not brought by Look magazine, but rather by a company con-
trolled by Hughes himself, which had bought the copyright from
Look's parent company.139
The Look article was published in 1954 and the book utilizing
portions of the article was not published until 1966. Look had done
nothing more with the article since it was published and apparently
132. 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966).
133. The code reads in pertinent part, "In determining whether the use made of a
work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include ..
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982) (emphasis added).
134. Id. § 107(1).
135. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984)
136. Id. at 792.
137. Nation, 723 F.2d at 208.
138. 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966).
139. Id. at 305.
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did not plan to bring any infringement action after learning of the
defendant's book.1 4° But even before acquiring the copyright,
Hughes threatened the defendants that if they published the book
there would be "trouble."1 41 Thus it appeared that the real purpose
of the infringement action, seeking an injunction, was for censor-
ship of the biography. 142 This was the crucial factor in the court's
decision.143 However, instead of deciding the case on first amend-
ment grounds, that is, the allowance of an injunction would have
granted a license to censor information in the public interest, the
court indulged in a "stretching" of the fair use doctrine.
First, the court pointed out that the amount of copying was "in-
substantial" and that the defendant utilized much of his own re-
search for the book.144 The court also alluded to a first amendment
consideration that sometimes copyright protection must
"subordinate" to a greater public interest.1 45 Under this general ru-
bric, the court said it was customary for biographies to utilize and
quote earlier works, and an author should not be precluded from
saving time by relying on prior works.
Second, the court addressed the issue whether fair use was avail-
able despite the commercial nature of the biography. The major-
ity 14 6 stated that the commercial factor was irrelevant if there was a
public benefit involved. This case, the first to stretch the fair use
concept in a way that is now commonplace in the Second Circuit,
was decided in 1966. This was before the codification of the fair use
doctrine and the specific, mandatory enunciation that the commer-
cial nature would be a factor in fair use. Congress could have made
an exception to this factor when the public interest is involved.1 47
This is particularly important with the recent Supreme Court pro-
nouncement that a commercial use is presumptively unfair.148
In addition, although the court in Nation relied on Rosemont it
failed to heed the Rosemont court's admonition. The court in
Rosemont expressly stated that extensive verbatim copying orpara-
phrasing, as was done in the Nation article, is not fair use.149 One
should also remember that this case was probably decided because
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 311-13 (Lumbard, C.J., concurring).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 306.
145. Id. at 307.
146. Although all three judges supported the majority decision by Judge Moore,
Judge Lumbard wrote a separate concurring opinion with whom Judge Hays subscribed
detailing the theory that censorship was involved in the case. Id. at 311-13.
147. But the House Report said the section was intended to maintain the status quo.
See supra note 83.
148. See supra notes 135-34 and accompanying text.
149. Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 310.
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the threat of censorship was involved. 150 If not construed on those
narrow grounds, then, at most, the Rosemont court's rationale only
carves out an exception under fair use for biographies in the public
interest. This will seldom create comfort for the deadline infringing
newspaper or broadcaster.
The second factor is the "nature" of the copyrighted work. 151
The court in Nation adopted the reasoning they used for the idea/
expression dichotomy.' 5 2 They said that since the infringing article
was factual there is limited protection.153 Using this argument is
specious, since the narrow protection reasoning was used to narrow
the copyrightable amount of the infringing article to 300 words. If
those 300 words are what the court is considering under fair use,
they have already decided they deserve protection. In other words,
under the court's own reasoning, narrow protection for public inter-
est information goes to the copyrightability of the words copied, not
necessarily the "nature" of the work.' 54 But the court in Nation
seems to say that this fair use factor must be considered in light of
whether the infringing portions are copied in the public interest.
The court in Nation blends this second factor with the third fac-
tor to be considered for fair use, "the amount and substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole."' 55
The court distinguished the district court's use of Wainwright Se-
curities Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp.156 In this Second Cir-
cuit case, the court found against the media defendant. The
decisive factor in the words of the court was that the defendant was
"chiseling for personal profit."'157
The defendant in Wainwright could hardly be considered to have
taken a "substantial" part of the copyrighted work when it reported
in the defendant's newspaper only the bottom line of what the plain-
tiff's stock research reports were saying. Although other fimancial
newspapers utilized plaintiff's work much like the defendants did in
Wainwright,'58 the transgressions of the Wainwright defendants
were that they advertised that they provided the latest information
from many financial reports, 15 9 and they provided the reports regu-
larly, unlike other publications. The final conclusion of the court in
Wainwright, granting an injunction, however, was correct. The
150. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
151. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1982).
152. Nation, 723 F.2d at 208.
153. Id.
154. See Petition, Nation, supra note 14, at 17.
155. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1982) (emphasis added).
156. 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977).
157. Id. at 97.
158. Id. at 95 n.2.
159. Id. at 96.
[V'ol. 21
20
California Western Law Review, Vol. 21 [1984], No. 3, Art. 1
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol21/iss3/1
AN EXCEPTION TO COPYRIGHT
court was forced to grapple with the problem that the plaintiff re-
ally wanted some publicity about their product in order to establish
their prominence in the field, but not enough that it wrecked the
value of the commodity to their subscribers.
The problem with the Wainwright decision is that the parts cop-
ied could be easily construed as just taking the facts, just as the
court decided in Nation.16° Only one or two paragraphs would be
utilized by the defendants from each page of the copyrighted finan-
cial report.1 6 1 The court based its decision on the fact that the ma-
terial taken represented "a substantial investment of time, money
and labor,"' 62 plus the lack of independent analysis or research by
the defendants.' 63 It is arguable whether the amount of time and
money put into the copyrighted work should have any bearing on
whether the infringer's product should be considered fair use.1 4
One other rationale used by the Wainwright court is important to
the problem presented by this Article. That is, the court's interpre-
tation of what is news. The court in Wainwright rejected the de-
fendant's claim of a news coverage exception to copyright. The
court said the defendant's infringement was "not legitimate cover-
age of a news event."' 65 The court in Nation eschewed the Wain-
wright approach. The justices in their decision said that the role of
the court under fair use is not to decide what is "news" but, rather,
whether a claim of news reporting is false.166
Finally, the fourth factor is consideration of the economic impact
both presently and potentially on the copyrighted work by the in-
fringing item. As stated, this factor is considered the most impor-
tant.' 67 Once again the court in the Nation case relied on their
idea/expression analysis to discount any economic impact. This is
despite the loss by President Ford of the $12,500 when Time maga-
zine refused to run the excerpts after the article appeared in The
160. See id. at 96 n.3, where the court gives excerpts from both the plaintiffs and
the defendant's publications.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 96.
163. Id.
164. The Supreme Court in Sony, however, lends some credence to the Wainwright
holding under their analysis of factor two, the nature of the copyrighted item. Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S.Ct. 774, 792 (1984). One of the
reasons the Court found the copying of programs on home video recorder was a fair use
was that they were merely "time-shifting" to watch a program offered for free to the
public at a different time. Id. The Wainwright publication was not offered for free.
Wainwright, 558 F.2d at 93.
165. Wainwright, 558 F.2d at 96.
166. Nation, 723 F.2d at 207. The Nation court distinguished Wainwright by finding
the infringement in Wainwright was of expression, not just facts and the defendant used
the plaintiff's reports on a regular basis not just one time as in The Nation article.
167. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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Nation.168 The Second Circuit said that the facts did not support
the proposition that the 300 words they found copyrightable caused
Time to cancel their contract.169
The Nation court's rationale can be contrasted to an earlier Sec-
ond Circuit decision where the court refused to uphold a summary
judgment because of the possibility of economic impairment. 170 In
Meerpol v. Nizer,171 the defendant reproduced twenty-eight copy-
righted letters, which had been out of print for twenty years. The
court said it was error to determine as a matter of law that there
was no financial impact. The court said a movie based on the let-
ters may have been possible. 172 Thus, there is a wide discrepancy
between the Meerpol court's finding of potential economic impair-
ment, therefore no fair use, and the Nation case where the plaintiff
had already lost $12,500 as a result of publication by the infringer,
but fair use was found.
These cases illustrate that although fair use is a "balancing" doc-
trine there is little consistency to the decisions even within the im-
portant Second Circuit. The most that can be said is that public
information will be given greater deference, as in the Nation case,
unless found not to be news as in Wainwright or as in the district
court's decision in Nation. There seems to be added protection for
biographies as in Rosemont but probably only if there is a threat of
censorship involved. Other Second Circuit cases have found action-
able infringement because of prior dealings between the plaintiff
and defendant before the infringement. 173 Some cases allow sub-
stantial copying without infringement, as in Nation, while others
find small amounts of copying, when the "heart" of the matter was
copied, an infringement, as in Wainwright.
There is one certainty in all these cases. That is, no court has
accepted any first amendment exception to copyright law. The
courts would rather stretch the copyright scheme to accommodate
an infringement ostensibly in the public interest. The problem with
this solution is two-fold. First, the stretching cases can be used as
precedent for nonpublic interest cases, causing improper decisions,
and second, there is no predictability for a newspaper or broad-
caster who has to decide whether a copyrighted item should be used
168. Nation, 557 F. Supp. at 1072.
169. Nation, 723 F.2d at 208.
170. Meerpol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977).
171. Id. at 1069-70.
172. Id. at 1070-71.
173. Roy Export Co. Establishment of Vaduz v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.,
672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982); Iowa State Univ. v. American Broadcasting Sys., 621
F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980).
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in the public interest. What is needed is a first amendment based
exception to the Copyright Act.
V. THE SOLUTION
The solution can be easy. Newspapers or broadcasters under
deadline pressures, would be granted a limited exemption from in-
fringement actions for use of copyrighted materials durmig the ini-
tial phase of a news story. There should be two qualifications.
First, in order to be granted the exemption, the media would be
required to carry the copyright notice during the use. Second, some
form of compulsory licensing would be required. 174
There are problems with this approach that need to be examined.
First, however, a look at what authority and justifications can be
found for such a solution.
A. Authority and Justifications
Several commentators have recommended some form of an ex-
ception to copyright infringement under the first amendment. 175
Most argue that whenever the "public interest" is involved, the
copyright interest must yield. 176 As shown by this Article, the
scope of the copyright scheme and the willingness of the courts to
expand the "protecting" doctrines, allow for the public interest re-
quirements of the first amendment. The problem detailed by this
Article, however, could not and should not be solved by a stretching
of copyright principles. The reason is two-fold. First, stretching
leads to a lack of predictability, resulting in a chilling effect on the
media. 177 Second, in order to stretch the copyright scheme far
enough to accommodate this problem would require an undermin-
ing of the Copyright Act. This is because the solution requires a
complete usurpation of the copyrighted work regardless of the eco-
nomic consequences to the holder of the copyright.
A paradigm based on Supreme Court decisions in the libel/pri-
174. See 1 NIMMER, supra, note 22, at 1-85. Professor Nuimer offers a compulsory
licensing for the wedded idea/expression problem. See supra notes 45-64 and accompa-
nying text. But Professor Nimmer would only offer this solution when a "photograph"
has not appeared in any publication for a month. The problem presented in this Article
is opposite to that addressed by Professor Nimmer, in that this problem concerns using
copyrighted material immediatly.
175. See Goldstein, Copyright, supra note 22, at 267; Rosenfield, Fair Use, supra
note 6, at 803.
176. Goldstein, Copyright and the First, supra note 22, at 988 (recommending an
"accomodation" scheme); Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech, supra note 5, at 267
(advocates an independent first amendment exception operating as an "external limita-
tion on the scope of the property interest"); Rosenfield, Fair Use, supra, note 6, at 803 (a
balance in favor of public rights).
177. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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vacy field has been suggested as a first amendment exception. 178
This idea has been criticized, 179 but does point out that the Supreme
Court has protected the "public interest" when clashing with pri-
vate interests including a loss of reputation. 180 A clash with a copy-
right would only involve a "proprietary" interest which should
rationally make the Court more inclined to accept such a solution
by analogy.18'
B. Problems with the Solution
As always the problem with any legislative or judicial doctrine is
the definitions. These warrant discussion. First, the question of
what deadline pressures would necessitate invoking the exception.
In most cases, this requirement should be limited to daily newspa-
pers or daily broadcasters who receive the copyrighted item in the
same twenty-four hour period that the item is to be printed or
broadcast. This period could be lengthened with a good faith show-
ing by the newspaper or broadcaster that they attempted to obtain a
license from the holder of the copyright, but, were unable to reach
the person.18 2
Although the Nation case would be a candidate for this excep-
tion, it may not be available for two reasons. First, The Nation is a
weekly publication, and second, Navasky, editor of The Nation, ap-
parently made no attempt to contact President Ford or his pub-
lisher about the publishing rights.'8 3 Navasky might argue,
correctly, that Ford or his publisher would refuse such a license and
178. Note, Constitutional Fair Use, 20 WM. & MARY L. REv. 85, 115-16 (1978);
Sobel, Copyright and the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm?, 19 COPYRIGHT L.
SYMp. (ASCAP) 43, 65 (1971); Goldstein, Copyright, supra note 22, at 994.
179. See, Goldwag, Copyright Infringement, supra note 5, at 21 n.89.
180. Times v. Sulivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
181. But cf. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). In
the Zacchini case the Court found a right of publicity for a circus act and that the right
was infringed when broadcast in its entirety on a night news broadcast. The Court
rejected first amendment arguments of the broadcaster defendant. Id. at 578. The
Court seemed to base their opinion on the fact that the entire act was broadcast and
analogized to copyright and patent law. Id. at 579-82 (Powell, J., dissenting).
If the Supreme Court was to adhere to the "entirety" reasoning, the solution offered
here would not set well with the Court. But in the Sony case the Court found video
taping of entire programs in the home was fair use. 104 S. Ct. 774, 784.
182. In two Second Circuit cases, first amendment and fair use defenses were re-
jected, apparently because the defedants had prior dealings with the plaintiffs, in other
words, they had a chance to obtain a license but did not, and still used the copyrighted
items. Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir.
1982); Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 621
F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980). Under the solution proposed, these defendants would not be
allowed an exception to copyright because of their prior dealings unless there was an
attempt at censorship involved.
183. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 723 F.2d 195, 199 (2d Cir.
1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984).
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it would be fruitless to contact them. Thus, since Navasky knew
the memoirs would be published anyway, his only "public interest"
argument is, that he would be denied a "scoop."
184
Alternatively, Navasky might fashion an argument around a
Rosemont rationale, that the copyright was causing censorship. But
the argument would be specious, as he knew the memoirs would
eventually be published.'85 A newspaper or broadcaster on dead-
line would have no time to ascertain whether the copyrighted item
they intend to publish will be available in a "timely" way for the
news story.
The second definitional problem is what is the "initial phase" of a
news story. Simply, the exception would be limited to use of the
copyrighted material for one time.1
86
The final problem is the most delicate; what is a legitimate news
story that would invoke the exception? Any story deemed worthy
of space in a newspaper or for broadcast time could be construed as
newsworthy. Therefore, the test should be judged by "external"
factors, not the determination by the internal subjective judgments
of the newspaper or broadcaster. But the standard should be
judged on the basis of information and events at the time of the
decision to use the copyrighted material not with hindsight of what
was actually newsworthy. Expert testimony might be helpful on
this prong of the test to determine whether the decision was made in
accordance with general journalistic standards of what news is in
furtherance of the public interest.
There is little chance this determination will not reflect the even-
tual merits of a story and the judiciary prejudices. The scheme,
however, promotes unpredictability and some comfort to a newspa-
per or broadcaster to know they will be judged on their decision by
journalistic standards, not the whims of a judge interpreting copy-
right doctrines.
In addition, this paradigm, provides a narrow first amendment
protection which is necessary without undermining copyright pro-
tections. The copyright owner, although impaired initially will
184. A "scoop" in newspaper terms is beating the competition to the story, that is,
publishing or broadcasting before anyone else. It is a time honored tradition of the
journalism profession, but inherent with dangers. The media know the risks of trying to
be first-error in the story. A good example is the reporting by C.B.S.'s Dan Rather
that President Reagan's press secretary, Jim Brady, was dead on the day the President
was shot when he wasn't, and in fact, he recovered. If the only justification a newspaper
or broadcaster has for running a copyrighted item is for a "scoop," that is, they know
the copyrighted item will be published by an authorized outlet in a timely fashion it can
be argued they should not fall under this exception.
185. Nation, 723 F.2d at 198. See also Petition, Nation, supra note 14, at 19.
186. One time use would include all the issues of a single daily run of a newspaper or
the editions of a station's news broadcasts during a twenty-four hour period.
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have his property returned, if you will, after a one time use for the
public interest which may even enhance its value.
CONCLUSION
Imagine once again the scenerio envisioned in the introduction of
this Article. 87 The editor or broadcaster has run the pictures ap-
parently in violation of the copyright and will be liable for damages.
Knowing this, we cannot expect the editor or broadcaster to take
the chance; thus, there is a chilling effect which hinders the market-
place of ideas which is guaranteed by the first amendment.
If, however, an exception under the first amendment is granted
the public interest will be satisfied. But, then, under the thesis of
this Article, the newspaper or broadcaster pays a compulsory li-
cense to the copyright holder and can begin negotiating for future
use. Thus, the tenents of the copyright statute and the first amend-
ment have both been met.
187. The use of the My Lai and Zapruder examples should not suggest that only
those that fall under Professor Nimmer's scheme of the idea and expression being "wed-
ded" would be included under the proposed solution. Photographs are the most likely
candidate under the solution. One can, however, imagine situations where prose or the
text of a speech might require use of the expression and the ideas to convey fully in
compliance with the public interest under the first amendment.
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